extensive form game
game in extensive form
#game_theory
#game_theory
Definition (two person zero-sum finite game)
An extensive form of a two-person zero-sum finite game without chance moves is a finite tree structure with
- a specific vertex indicating the starting point of the game
- a payoff function assigning a real number to each terminal vertex of the tree, determining the payoff (or respectively, loss) to P2 (respectively, P1)
- partition of the nodes of the tree into two player sets, and for P1 and P2 respectively
- subpartition of each player set into information sets , such that the same number of intermediate branches emanates from every node belonging to the same information set, and no node follows another node in the same information set
(convention: P1 minimizer, P2 maximizer)
Equivalent normal form
an equivalent normal form exists
Definition (vector form)
A game in extensive form (or extensive-form game) is an ordered vector
where
- is a finite set of players
- is a tree called the game tree
- is the partition of the set of vertices that are not leaves
- is the set of possible game outcomes
- is a function associating each leaf of the tree with a game outcome in
Definition (game in extensive form with chance moves and imperfect information)
A game in extensive form (with chance moves and with imperfect information) is a vector
where, in addition to the variables above,
- is a probability distribution over the set of edges from ,
- is a partition of for a player
- the pair is an information set of player for each player and
Here, each element in the partition of is an information set of player .
Notes
- may be described by directed graph
- finite games may be described by finite graphs, infinite games by infinite graphs
- measure theory may be used to describe infinite games
References
- T. Başar and G.J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd edition, Classics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, Philadelphia, 1999, pp. 36-39.
- M. Maschler, E. Solan, and Shmuel Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 43.
- https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ 203/ExtensiveForm.pdf
- https://web.xidian.edu.cn/luanhao/files/20180411_115325.pdf
- https://www.asc.ohio-state.edu/peck.33/gametheory/extensive
- https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/2234391/signalling-game-how-to-draw-the-normal-form-matrix
- https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ 203/ExtensiveForm.pdf
- https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~kevinlb/teaching/cs532a - 2006-7/lectures/lect11.pdf